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Moral emotions are critically important in guiding appropriate social conduct. Empirical
investigation of these emotions remains a challenge, however, because of the difficulty in
eliciting them reliably in controlled settings. Here we describe a novel prejudice paradigm
that aimed to elicit both negatively and positively valenced moral emotions in real-time.
Low-prejudice females (N =46) who met highly specific demographic and personality-
based screening criteria completed a series of Implicit Association Tests (IATs). Feedback
following these IATs was pre-programmed to either endorse participants’ non-prejudiced
self-standards (positive condition), or to contradict their self-standards (negative condition),
in response to sensitive social topics. Neutral condition IATs reflected participants’ attitudes
toward non-sensitive social topics. Results demonstrated that the IATs were successful
in eliciting moral-positive emotions (satisfaction and pride) and moral-negative emotions
(primarily guilt). In addition, participants high in self-reported punishment sensitivity, as
assessed by the Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) scale, reported greater guilt.
Keywords: emotion elicitation, moral emotions, guilt, implicit association test, behavioral inhibition
Over the past 20 years, basic emotions such as fear, happiness, and
anger have been the main focus of psychological and neurosci-
entific research into affective processing (Cacioppo et al., 2000;
LeDoux, 2000; Rainville et al., 2006). Consequently, we have a
better understanding of these emotions’ functional organization,
behavioral motivation, and neuroanatomical correlates. In con-
trast, empirical studies on the more complex moral emotions that
arise in social contexts, such as guilt, embarrassment, and com-
passion, have become prominent only recently (Haidt, 2003; Moll
et al., 2008). Although interest in these social emotions is increas-
ing rapidly, the complexities of conducting research in this area
are considerable.
Moral emotions are powerful motivational forces that help us
distinguish between right and wrong. Failure in the appropriate
production of these emotions has been associated with several
neurologic and psychiatric disorders, and may lead to amoral or
socially inappropriate behavior (Muller et al., 2003; Pardini et al.,
2003; Sturm et al.,2008; Blair,2010). Guilt, shame,embarrassment,
and pride are moral emotions that belong to a small family of self-
conscious emotions. They are called “self-conscious” because the
self is the object of evaluation, and because they are evoked by
either implicit or explicit self-reflection (Tangney et al., 2007).
As self-reflection occurs, these emotions provide immediate feed-
back on behavior and may take on a punishing or reinforcing
role in terms of the event’s moral acceptability (Tracy and Robins,
2004).
A new wave of emotion research is underscoring the impor-
tance of studying emotions in real emotion-evoking situations,
in scenarios that are personally relevant to participants and where
emotions are experienced in real-time (e.g.,Williams and DeSteno,
2008; Fourie et al., 2011). This approach is believed to be more
ecologically valid than elicitation methods employing hypotheti-
cal or remembered scenarios, which may rely more on intellectual
contemplation and may differ notably from emotional reactions
to actual events (Herrald and Tomaka, 2002; Wilson and Gilbert,
2005; Harmon-Jones et al., 2007).
The task of eliciting authentic emotional responses in the labo-
ratory is, however, particularly problematic for researchers study-
ing the self-conscious emotions (Tracy and Robins,2004). Whereas
basic emotions can, for example, be elicited reliably through use
of specific affectively laden media, the elicitors of self-conscious
emotions can be viewed as internal cognitive events (Lewis, 2000).
Specific self-conscious emotions thus do not appear to be distin-
guished purely by the nature of external stimuli, or by the types of
situations that elicit them; rather, it is the manner in which individ-
uals perceive the situation that defines the emotion. Furthermore,
self-conscious emotions are founded in social relationships, and
have been argued to arise expressly from concerns about others’
evaluation of the self, whether they are real or imagined (Leary,
2004). These emotions also appear to be strongly influenced by
the cultural context and personal beliefs of participants (Bier-
brauer, 1992; Haidt, 2003). Finally, deception is often necessary
to evoke intense self-conscious emotions, which in turn raises eth-
ical concerns (Harmon-Jones et al., 2007). These factors thus make
the laboratory-based study of self-conscious emotions particularly
tricky.
Moral emotion elicitation paradigms used in previous studies
include: (i) script-driven imagery, where participants are required
to recall and relive a past emotive experience (Wagner et al., 2011),
(ii) picture or film stimuli that are used to elicit the emotions
(Moll et al., 2002), (iii) vignettes where participants have to imag-
ine their reactions to hypothetical moral scenarios (Finger et al.,
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2006; Kédia et al., 2008), and (iv) experimental contexts, by far
in the minority, where participants are placed in real, emotion-
evoking situations that pertain to their actual behavior (Herrald
and Tomaka, 2002). The problem with re-living a previous emo-
tional experience is that it is different phenomenologically from
the original emotional encounter and constitutes, at best, a weaker
form of the original emotion (Shin et al., 2000). Likewise, emo-
tion induction through visual stimuli, such as emotion-laden films,
is limited by several factors (Rottenberg et al., 2007). For exam-
ple, a major problem with this approach is that films are high in
cognitive demand and attentional capture, which will impact on
the overall emotional response (Levenson, 2003). Finally, read-
ing short emotive vignettes may be associated more with making
emotional judgments in line with task demands, rather than with
experiencing real affect (Levenson, 2003). In this regard, Casebeer
(2003) pointed out that moral cognition is genuine – our moral
equipment (including the moral emotions) evolved to effectively
coordinate actual behavior, not hypothetical scenarios.
With this discussion in mind, we developed and tested a preju-
dice paradigm to elicit moral emotions in real-time. Our aim was
to contribute to the study of moral emotions by devising an emo-
tion elicitation paradigm of high ecological validity that would
elicit real affective states relevant to the participant. The para-
digm relied on a central finding in social psychological research
into prejudiced attitudes: frequently, people who claim to hold
egalitarian attitudes toward certain social groups show preju-
diced tendencies on implicit measures of prejudice (Banaji and
Greenwald, 1995; Phelps et al., 2000; Devine et al., 2002). These
contradictory responses appear to emerge because conscious deci-
sions to renounce prejudice against those who are different (e.g.,
in their ethnicity, gender, or sexual preference) do not necessar-
ily rid us of prejudiced responses (Allport, 1954; Devine, 1989).
Of importance to the present study, however, is that discrepancies
between personal standards and actual responses (of prejudice) are
associated with distinct affective consequences. Previous research
has demonstrated that low-prejudice individuals typically expe-
rience guilt when they transgress their well-internalized moral
standards (Monteith, 1993; Monteith et al., 2002; Amodio et al.,
2007), whereas pride ensues when our actions conform to or
uphold a personal moral value (Moll et al., 2008; Zahn et al., 2009).
In our paradigm, we presented a carefully selected sample of
low-prejudice individuals with feedback of either high or non-
existent prejudice following several Implicit Association Tests
(IATs). The IAT is a reaction-time task designed to measure
implicit influences on behavior by assessing the strengths of
automatic associations between mental representations of objects
(Greenwald et al., 1998). Instead of calculating actual IAT results,
however, all IAT feedback in our task was pre-programmed to
ensure the elicitation of moral-negative and moral-positive affect,
respectively. More specifically, participants were led to think that
they had transgressed their personal moral values (guilt induc-
tion), or that they had responded in accordance with their personal
moral values (pride induction).
Although previous research has demonstrated that implicit
racial biases on the IAT may lead to feelings of guilt (Monteith
et al., 2001, 2002), the IAT paradigm we developed here contributes
uniquely to the study of moral emotion elicitation. In particular, in
a departure from previous IAT studies, we did not rely on partic-
ipants’ implicit biases toward a specific social group to determine
the IAT outcome; rather, we fitted all IATs with carefully scripted,
pre-programmed feedback. This strategy sought to ensure the elic-
itation of target emotional states within each individual, rather
than only in a subset who performed according to expectations. In
order to make the feedback more plausible (and hence secure the
success of the manipulation), however, we screened and selected
all volunteers for participation based on several demographic and
personality-based criteria. The current study thus describes a par-
adigm of high practical value to elicit not only moral-negative, but
also moral-positive, emotions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
DESIGN AND PARTICIPANTS
The initial pool of participants (N = 280) was drawn from a popu-
lation of female undergraduate students between the ages of 18 and
25. These individuals were recruited through web-based notifica-
tion and advertisements on noticeboards, and completed a 30-min
web-based screening survey (Stage I). Based on responses to that
survey, we selected a smaller sample (N = 48) to participate in the
laboratory-based emotion elicitation experiment (Stage II). We
used a female-only sample to reduce possible sex-related variation
in emotional experience (Shields, 1991).
Participants received course credit in exchange for participa-
tion. Study procedures were approved by the Research Ethics Com-
mittees of the UCT Department of Psychology and the UCT Fac-
ulty of Health Sciences. After exclusion of two participants based
on high scores (>20) on the Beck Depression Inventory – Second
Edition (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996), the final sample consisted of 46
females (age: M = 20.20; SD= 2.77).
PROCEDURE AND MATERIALS
We required participants in the laboratory elicitation paradigm to
be screened and selected carefully, and so the study was, as men-
tioned above, divided into two stages. Stage I, the screening and
selection stage, was aimed at identifying individuals who met eli-
gibility criteria to participate in Stage II, the actual experiment,
during which they would perform various IATs and receive bogus
feedback.
Stage I: screening and selection
Participants completed an online survey consisting of several mea-
sures. The survey began with a demographic section that asked for
information about sex, age, race, religion, sexuality, and home lan-
guage. To secure the success of the experimental manipulation,
demographic inclusion criteria included being female, between
the ages of 18 and 25, White, heterosexual, non-Jewish, and
English-speaking.
The second section of the survey required participants to com-
plete the Internal and External Motivation to Respond without
Prejudice scales (IMS/EMS; Plant and Devine, 1998), which were
modified for our purposes to have Black as well as homosexual
people as target social categories. We used this measure to iden-
tify individuals who were internally motivated to respond without
prejudice toward those targets (i.e., those with high IMS scores).
High IMS individuals’ non-prejudiced values are thought to be
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integrated into their self-concepts, making them more prone to
experience specific feelings of guilt following a personal moral
transgression (Higgins, 1987; Plant and Devine, 1998). We also
sought to identify individuals with high EMS scores, because they
appear to be less effective in regulating their responses on implicit
measures of prejudice (Devine et al., 2002; Amodio et al., 2003).
High EMS individuals are motivated by social (i.e., external) pres-
sures to respond without prejudice. Hence, to be eligible for Stage
II, participants needed to score above the sample median on both
the IMS and EMS for both target social categories.
The third section of the survey included four rating thermome-
ters (e.g., Herek, 2000) that required participants to give a single
attitude rating (between 0˚ and 100˚) for each of four different
social groups: (a) Black individuals, (b) Jewish individuals, (c)
homosexual individuals, and (d) fat individuals. A thermometer
rating of 0˚ indicated an extremely unfavorable (cold) attitude
toward a particular group, whereas a rating of 100˚ indicated
an extremely favorable (warm) attitude toward that group. Here,
we were looking for individuals who indicated a favorable rating
(≥60˚) toward all social groups.
Stage II: laboratory experiment
Participants who met the selection criteria described above were
contacted telephonically and invited to attend the laboratory
session. A white female experimenter tested each participant
individually after informed consent had been obtained.
At the beginning of the session, participants were informed that
the purpose of the study was the investigation of prejudiced atti-
tudes among university students. They were told that psychology
literature shows that there is a significant discrepancy between
what people say they feel, and what they really feel, toward dif-
ferent social groups. Further, they were told that our hypothesis
was that this implicit-explicit discrepancy has become smaller in
recent years due to the educative value of the media and the con-
temporary political and cultural zeitgeist. Finally, they were told
that they had been selected specifically for this study based on
the results of the online survey (i.e., the survey had shown that
they held positive explicit attitudes toward most social groups),
and that we would now test their implicit attitudes toward these
same social groups. The true nature of the experiment was thus
withheld from participants because knowing that our aim was to
elicit moral emotions might have invalidated their responses due
to demand characteristics. The actual intention of the study, how-
ever, was revealed at the end of the session, during a thorough
debriefing.
Questionnaires
After presentation of the cover story, participants completed sev-
eral personality and mood questionnaires. These included the
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule [PANAS; Watson et al.,
1988; used to measure general levels of positive affect (PA) and
negative affect (NA)], and the Affect Intensity Measure (AIM:
Larsen and Diener, 1987; used to measure the intensity with which
positive and negative emotions are typically experienced). Par-
ticipants also completed the Behavioral Inhibition System and
Behavioral Activation System scales (BIS/BAS; Carver and White,
1994) to measure their tendencies toward behavioral inhibition
and behavioral activation sensitivity. Individuals with high BIS
sensitivity should be naturally inclined to fixate on possible threats
or punishment in their environment, and should be prone to expe-
rience negative affect (Gray, 1975, 1982; Gray and McNaughton,
2000). In contrast, individuals with high BAS sensitivity should be
more responsive to cues of reward and more prone to experience
positive affect.
We included the PANAS, AIM, and BIS/BAS so that we
could investigate whether there were any meaningful relation-
ships between affective traits and the self-reported magnitude of
emotion elicited by our manipulation.
Emotion elicitation paradigm: modified IATs
After completing these questionnaires, participants were intro-
duced to the IAT section of the protocol, which took approximately
25 min to complete. The researcher explained the task with the
help of a detailed PowerPoint presentation, which was displayed
on a 13′′ computer monitor situated approximately 0.5 m from
the participant. The presentation, which consisted of timed slides,
also introduced the different social groups that participants would
encounter during the IATs.
Prior to starting the study IATs, participants were required to
do a practice IAT (on the topic of disability) on the Project Implicit
website (https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/). This procedure
helped to familiarize them with the task, and served to increase
the credibility of our experimental paradigm. Before beginning
the study IATs, participants were encouraged to approach the
researcher if anything was unclear, and were also informed that
the researcher would receive immediate feedback on their IAT
results via a networked computer monitor on the other side of the
laboratory.
We used a modified version of the conventional IAT (see
Nosek et al., 2005 for more details) to elicit moral-negative and
moral-positive affect in the selected low-prejudice individuals. In
short, after the reaction-time task during which different concepts
were paired with the words “good” or “bad,” our paradigm pro-
vided participants with pre-programmed response feedback (see
Appendix). We used six different IATs, divided into three different
response categories: Neutral, Positive, and Negative. The topics for
the Neutral IATs were sports (preference for swimmers vs. runners)
and facial hair (preference for facial hair vs. no facial hair). The
topics for the Positive IATs were weight (preference for fat vs. thin
people) and religion (preference for Judaism vs. other religions).
The topics for the Negative IATs were sexuality (preference for
gay vs. straight people) and race (preference for Black vs. White
people).
Feedback for the Neutral IATs, unlike that of the Positive
and Negative IATs, was not pre-programmed; instead, the results
reflected the participant’s true implicit attitudes. The Neutral IATs
were not expected to elicit any strong positive or negative affect,
however, because these option categories were not controversial in
a social sense, and hence any preference would only be a matter of
personal choice.
The IATs crucial to the elicitation of moral-negative affect were
the two in the Negative IAT condition. All participants received
the same manipulated feedback, which suggested that the asso-
ciations they made during the task were indicative of significant
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discriminatory attitudes against Black and homosexual individ-
uals, despite the fact that their self-report during the screening
and selection stage had suggested they were not prejudiced against
these groups. We anticipated that the combination of the nega-
tive feedback and the participant’s awareness of her results being
observed by the researcher would be effective in eliciting feelings
of guilt (and, to a lesser degree, shame and embarrassment).
The IATs crucial to the elicitation of moral-positive affect
were the two in the Positive IAT condition. Participants again
received manipulated feedback which suggested that the associ-
ations they made during the task were indicative of egalitarian
attitudes toward people of all different weights/religions. These
associations, then, confirmed the self-reports they had made dur-
ing the screening and selection stage. We anticipated that receiving
feedback indicating that they respect people from various religions
equally, and likewise show no prejudice against fat people, would
induce positive emotions of pride and satisfaction in participants.
At the same time, these IATs validated participants’non-prejudiced
beliefs and therefore enhanced the credibility of our paradigm.
The IATs were pre-programmed in a pseudo-random order
with the only constraint that a Neutral condition IAT was always
presented first. We devised five counter-balanced presentation
orders so that every sixth participant received the same string of
IATs.
Measurement of state affect during the elicitation paradigm
After each IAT, the participant received a 10-s feedback slide on her
performance. This feedback was followed by a 20-s slide that gave
more elaborate and detailed feedback about the attitudes revealed
by the just-completed IAT (see Appendix for IAT feedback). This
elaboration and detail was aimed at strengthening the emotional
experience felt in response to the brief feedback. After viewing
the 20-s slide, participants were required to complete an emotion
checklist. This measure, which we designed to verify the elicita-
tion of target emotional states in response to the IAT feedback,
asked participants to rate the degree to which they experienced
each of seven different emotions (guilt, shame, embarrassment,
anxiety, fear, pride, and satisfaction). They gave their ratings along
a five-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very
much).
Post-experimental interview
At the conclusion of the experimental manipulation, each par-
ticipant was interviewed individually. During this interview,
the participant was first asked to choose, from a list of eight
options (the same as above, plus neutral), the primary emo-
tion she had experienced following each IAT. Participants were
then carefully probed for any other emotional experiences as
well, i.e., whether they experienced a different emotion to those
listed in the emotion checklist. If the participant chose an emo-
tion other than the anticipated target emotion (e.g., if she
had primarily experienced anger or disbelief following presen-
tation of the race IAT), she was requested to explain why she
had not experienced that target emotion. Finally, each par-
ticipant was debriefed, informed of the true nature of the
study, and asked not to discuss the experiment with fellow
students.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
No inferential statistical analyses were performed on the Stage I
measures; these served only as instruments to select participants
suitable for Stage II.
The data of primary interest were those derived from the
emotion checklists participants completed following each of the
six IATs. We took two steps to reduce the number of depen-
dent variables in the major inferential analyses. First, data from
the checklists for IATs in the same response category were col-
lapsed (e.g., the race and sexuality IAT emotion ratings were
collapsed, and the weight and religion IAT emotion ratings were
collapsed). Statistical analyses indicated that there were no signifi-
cant affect differences between IATs in the same response category
(ps> 0.06); our approach was thus justified. Second, we collapsed
the data on each checklist into three emotion indices: (a) moral-
negative emotion (consisting of the mean of ratings for guilt,
shame, and embarrassment); (b) moral-positive emotion (mean of
ratings for pride and satisfaction); and (c) basic-negative emotion
(mean of ratings for fear and anxiety). Statistical analyses indi-
cated that there were no significant differences between ratings
of guilt, shame, and embarrassment in the Negative IAT condi-
tion (p> 0.60). However, participants’ ratings of satisfaction were
significantly higher than that of pride in the Positive IAT condi-
tion (p< 0.01). Our decision to collapse pride and satisfaction was
based on the notion that pride and moral self-satisfaction are typ-
ically felt in response to actions that are in accordance with one’s
moral norms (Montada, 1993). Hence, each participant generated
three emotion index scores (moral-negative, moral-positive, and
basic-negative) for each of the Negative, Positive, and Neutral IAT
sets.
Following these data manipulations, our statistical analyses
proceeded across four stages. First, we conducted a 3 (IAT stimulus
condition: Neutral, Positive, Negative)× 3 (emotion type: moral-
negative, moral-positive, and basic-negative) repeated-measures
ANOVA. This analysis explored whether the Negative and Positive
IATs had elicited the target emotions most strongly (e.g., whether
the Negative IATs had elicited moral-negative emotions more
strongly than the Positive and Neutral IATs). In instances where the
assumption of sphericity was violated, the degrees of freedom were
corrected using Greenhouse–Geisser epsilon corrections. These
correction factors are reported.
Second, we conducted two separate one-way repeated-
measures ANOVAs on emotion index data from within IAT condi-
tions. The first compared the moral-negative, moral-positive, and
basic-negative data that followed the Positive IATs, and the other
did the same comparison for the Negative IATs. These analyses
sought to determine whether the specified target emotions had
been most strongly elicited within the related IAT (e.g., whether
the Negative IATs had elicited the moral-negative emotions more
strongly than the basic-negative and moral-positive emotions).
Third, to investigate potential relationships between individual
differences in affective traits and the elicitation of target emo-
tions, we generated zero-order correlations between the data from
the experimental questionnaires (PANAS, AIM, and BIS/BAS)
and those from the emotion indices. Finally, we examined post-
experimental interview data in an attempt to identify aspects
of an individual’s personal characteristics and social/familial
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relationships that might have impacted the effective elicitation
of target emotions, but that were not measured during Stage
I. The Stage II sample was then refined further by excluding
those individuals with potentially confounding personal char-
acteristics and/or social/familial relationships, and the statis-
tical analyses described above were repeated on this refined
group.
RESULTS
STAGE I: SCREENING DATA
Figure 1 demonstrates the flow of participants through the differ-
ent stages of the study. As can be seen, more than 70% of the Stage
I participants did not meet eligibility criteria for Stage II. Excluded
individuals were those who scored below the IMS sample median
(6.80) and below the EMS sample median (4.60) for both tar-
get categories, and/or rated their attitude toward one/more social
group(s) as below 60˚ on the rating thermometers.
FIGURE 1 | Flowchart detailing the number of participants across the
various stages of the study.
STAGE II: SELF-REPORTED EMOTIONS DURING THE ELICITATION
PARADIGM
Table 1 shows descriptive data from the self-report emotion
checklists for each IAT.
Emotion elicitation across IAT conditions
Figure 2 shows that the Negative IATs (race and sexuality) elicited
moral-negative emotions more strongly than the Positive IATs
(weight and religion), whereas the opposite was true for the moral-
positive emotions. Inferential statistical analyses supported these
impressions: the two-way (stimulus condition× emotion type)
repeated-measures ANOVA detected a significant main effect for
stimulus condition, F(1.69, 75.91)= 8.74, p< 0.001, ω2= 0.12,
ε= 0.84, as well as for emotion type, F(1.60, 71.92)= 13.83,
p< 0.001, ω2= 0.28, ε= 0.80. Moreover, the interaction was sig-
nificant, F(2.28, 102.37)= 50.56, p< 0.001, ω2= 0.66, ε= 0.57;
emotion ratings therefore varied depending on the stimulus
condition.
To break down the interaction, we performed several post-hoc
comparisons. Significant interactions were revealed when com-
paring the Negative IAT condition to the Neutral IAT condition in
terms of scores on the moral-negative emotion index compared
to scores on both the basic-negative emotion index (p< 0.001,
r = 0.72) and moral-positive emotion index (p< 0.001, r = 0.80).
These interactions reflect the fact that scores on the moral-negative
emotion index increased significantly more than scores on the
basic-negative and moral-positive emotion indices in the Negative
IAT condition compared to the Neutral IAT condition.
Similarly, significant interactions were revealed when compar-
ing the Positive IAT condition to the Neutral IAT condition in
terms of scores on the moral-positive emotion index compared
to scores on both the moral-negative emotion index (p= 0.01,
r = 0.36) and basic-negative emotion index (p= 0.001, r = 0.48).
Therefore, scores on the moral-positive emotion index increased
significantly more than scores on the moral-negative and basic-
negative emotion indices in the Positive IAT condition compared
to the Neutral IAT condition.
Table 1 | Self-reported emotions from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much) during the IAT elicitation paradigm (N =46).
Emotions IAT condition
Positive Negative Neutral
Weight Religion Race Sexuality Sport Facial hair
Moral-negative 1.51 (0.79) 1.20 (0.44) 2.90 (1.22) 2.57 (1.22) 1.40 (0.59) 1.61 (0.87)
Guilt 1.57 (0.81) 1.24 (0.67) 2.87 (1.33) 2.50 (1.36) 1.50 (0.84) 1.52 (0.86)
Shame 1.52 (0.91) 1.22 (0.59) 2.87 (1.38) 2.54 (1.36) 1.28 (0.54) 1.50 (0.94)
Embarrassment 1.46 (0.66) 1.15 (0.56) 2.96 (1.43) 2.67 (1.42) 1.41 (0.75) 1.80 (1.07)
Basic-negative 1.26 (0.56) 1.29 (0.61) 1.76 (0.92) 1.47 (0.65) 1.61 (0.87) 1.36 (0.59)
Fear 1.11 (0.38) 1.15 (0.42) 1.54 (0.89) 1.24 (0.57) 1.30 (0.73) 1.15 (0.42)
Anxiety 1.41 (0.75) 1.43 (0.91) 1.98 (1.13) 1.70 (0.92) 1.91 (1.13) 1.57 (0.91)
Moral-positive 2.40 (1.32) 2.67 (1.35) 1.43 (0.79) 1.35 (0.71) 2.39 (1.05) 1.90 (1.11)
Pride 2.11 (1.32) 2.46 (1.57) 1.37 (0.83) 1.43 (0.89) 2.07 (1.18) 1.70 (1.19)
Satisfaction 2.70 (1.31) 2.89 (1.48) 1.50 (0.94) 1.26 (0.57) 2.72 (1.26) 2.11 (1.22)
Data presented are means, with standard deviations in parentheses.
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FIGURE 2 | Mean ratings for each emotion index following the Neutral,
Positive, and Negative IATs. Error bars indicate standard deviations.
Finally, when the Negative IAT condition was compared to
the Positive IAT condition, scores on the moral-negative emo-
tion index again increased significantly more than scores on both
the basic-negative and moral-positive emotion indices (ps≤ 0.001,
rs> 0.70).
Emotion elicitation within IAT conditions
Figure 2 shows that, following each of the Positive IATs (weight
and religion), participants reported experiencing moral-positive
emotions more strongly than moral-negative and basic-negative
emotions. A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA conducted on
these data, and subsequent Bonferroni post-hoc tests, confirmed
there was a significant main effect for emotion index, F(1.27,
57.20)= 39.73, p< 0.001, ω2= 0.43, ε= 0.64, and that moral-
positive emotions were elicited significantly more strongly fol-
lowing the Positive IATs than were the moral-negative and basic-
negative emotions, ps< 0.001, rs> 0.68. There was no significant
difference in the strength of elicitation of moral-negative and
basic-negative emotions following the Positive IATs (p= 0.90).
Similarly, Figure 2 shows that, following each of the Nega-
tive IATs (race and sexuality), participants reported experiencing
moral-negative emotions more strongly than moral-positive and
basic-negative emotions. A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA
conducted on these data, and subsequent Bonferroni post-hoc
tests, confirmed there was a significant main effect for emo-
tion index, F(1.52, 68.54)= 33.69, p< 0.001, ω2= 0.40, ε= 0.76,
and that moral-negative emotions were elicited significantly more
strongly following the Negative IATs than were the moral-positive
and basic-negative emotions, ps< 0.001, rs> 0.67. There was
no significant difference in the strength of elicitation of moral-
positive and basic-negative emotions following the Negative IATs
(p= 0.37).
Table 2 | Correlations between questionnaire scores and self-reported
affect in the positive and negative IAT conditions (N =46).
Mean (SD) Negative IATs Positive IATs
MOR-NEG BAS-NEG MOR-POS
SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRES
PA 33.96 (6.65) – – 0.08
NA 19.35 (5.76) 0.31* 0.21 –
AIM total 154.59 (16.10) 0.13 −0.01 −0.04
BIS 22.00 (3.54) 0.47** 0.27 0.20
BAS total 41.04 (4.92) −0.12 −0.45** −0.25
Drive 11.11 (2.15) −0.19 −0.34* −0.21
Fun seeking 12.57 (2.66) −0.12 −0.31* −0.02
Reward
responsiveness
17.37 (1.69) 0.08 −0.30* 0.37*
PA, positive affective schedule; NA, negative affective schedule; AIM, affect inten-
sitymeasure; BIS, behavioral inhibition system; BAS, behavioral approach system;
MOR-NEG, moral-negative emotions; BAS-NEG, basic-negative emotions; MOR-
POS, moral-positive emotions.
*p<0.05 (two-tailed). **p<0.01 (two-tailed).
ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN PERSONALITY MEASURES AND ELICITED
EMOTIONS
Table 2 shows descriptive data for the Stage II questionnaires,
as well as zero-order correlations between these questionnaire
measures and target emotions obtained from the IAT emotion
checklists. Participants’ scores for the PANAS and BIS/BAS scales
were comparable to that of a random female sample (Watson
et al., 1988; Carver and White, 1994), whereas their AIM scores
were in the average range (Larsen, 1984). Consistent with previ-
ous work, participants’ BIS and BAS scores were also uncorrelated
(r =−0.05, p= 0.72). Non-parametric tests were performed on
data that did not meet assumptions underlying parametric test-
ing. Because so many correlations were computed, we interpreted
only those significant at the 1% level.
Significant associations were those between BIS scores and
moral-negative emotions following the Negative IATs. Further
investigation of the relationship of the BIS and emotions elicited
by the Negative IATs, through separation of the moral-negative
index into its three constituent emotions (i.e., guilt, shame, and
embarrassment), showed that there was also a significant positive
correlation between BIS sensitivity and self- reported guilt as well
as shame, rs= 0.52, ps< 0.001, but not embarrassment, r = 0.29,
p= 0.06.
Significant negative correlations were also detected between
BAS sensitivity (including BAS Total, as well as scores on the
Drive, Fun seeking, and Reward responsiveness subscales) and the
basic-negative emotions elicited by the Negative IATs.
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS: POTENTIAL IMPACT ON STRENGTH OF
ELICITATION
The post-experimental interviews were important to establish
which emotions participants felt most strongly following each
IAT. During these interviews we established that, following pre-
sentation of the Positive IATs, 34 participants (74% of the entire
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sample) experienced mostly satisfaction, whereas 4 (8.7%) felt
mostly pride, and 7 (15.3%) felt neutral. In comparison, following
presentation of the Negative IATs, 23 participants (50%) experi-
enced mostly guilt, 2 (4.3%) felt mostly shame, and 5 (10.9%)
felt mostly embarrassed. Sixteen participants, however, reported
experiencing only disbelief, anger, or surprise in response to the
Negative IAT feedback, which claimed that they held prejudiced
attitudes toward Black and homosexual people.
Further questioning revealed that these 16 participants had per-
sonal characteristics and/or social-familial relationships that may
have impacted on the success of the emotion elicitation paradigm
(and, in particular, on the likelihood of eliciting guilt following the
Negative IATs). Specifically, during the interviews we learned that
three participants had a Black partner, two had a Black relative,
and eight had a Black best friend. Clearly, these participants might
not have believed the bogus feedback given to them following
their completion of the race IAT, and so might not have expe-
rienced guilt in response to that manipulation. We also learned
during the interviews that nine participants had close friends who
were homosexual. Again, these facts might have made the emo-
tion induction less plausible, thereby preventing the elicitation of
specific feelings of guilt.
Hence, we re-ran the same analyses described above, this time
excluding the data from those 16 participants identified as having
potentially confounding personal characteristics and/or social-
familial relationships. We expected that trends in the data and
observed relationships would become more significant in this
refined sample (N = 30).
These expectations were confirmed: as Figure 3 illustrates, in
the refined sample, moral-negative emotions were elicited even
more strongly by the Negative IATs (M = 3.11, SD= 0.93) than
they were in the original sample (M = 2.74, SD= 1.10), compared
to basic-negative and moral-positive emotions, F(2, 58)= 56.33,
FIGURE 3 | Strength of elicited emotions following only the Negative
IATs for the entire Stage II sample (N =46), as well as for the refined
sample (N =30). Error bars indicate standard deviations.
p< 0.001,ω2= 0.63. In addition, the correlation between BIS sen-
sitivity and the moral-negative emotions elicited by the Negative
IATs increased from r = 0.47 (p< 0.01) to r = 0.55 (p< 0.01).
DISCUSSION
Developing methods to investigate moral emotions within a lab-
oratory setting has been an ongoing challenge for researchers
interested in learning how these emotions affect behavior and
motivation (Tangney, 1996; Eisenberg, 2000; Lewis, 2000; Tracy
and Robins, 2007). Perhaps the biggest confounding factor with
existing elicitation methods is that the participant is not placed in
emotion-evoking situations where he/she is the causal agent within
a real situation, i.e., as the person who performed the embarrass-
ing, shameful, or praiseworthy act. Rather, participants are often
asked to imagine or remember an emotional event with themselves
as the protagonist. The present study documents the development
of a novel method to elicit moral emotions as salient affective
states relevant to the participant. To this end, the paradigm made
use of pre-programmed feedback of either high or non-existent
prejudice on several IATs designed to elicit moral-negative and
moral-positive emotions in low-prejudice individuals.
SUBJECTIVE EMOTION REPORTS
Our paradigm, which involved a deceptive cover story and an
IAT-based prejudice manipulation, proved effective: subjective
emotion reports indicated that specific emotions of guilt, and to a
lesser extent pride, were elicited. Specifically, our first set of analy-
ses confirmed that moral-negative emotions (guilt, shame, and
embarrassment) were elicited significantly more strongly by the
Negative IATs than by the Positive and Neutral IATs. Similarly,
moral-positive emotions (pride and satisfaction) were elicited
significantly more strongly by the Positive IATs than by the Neg-
ative and Neutral IATs. Our second set of analyses compared the
strength of emotional experience as it occurred within each of
the Negative and Positive IAT conditions. These analyses showed
that moral-positive emotions were elicited more strongly by the
Positive IATs than were the moral-negative and basic-negative
emotions (fear and anxiety). Similarly, moral-negative emotions
were elicited more strongly by the Negative IATs than were the
moral-positive and basic-negative emotions.
In sum, these two sets of results showed that the specific
IATs elicited the targeted emotions effectively, but also that, when
elicited, the target emotions were experienced significantly more
strongly than the non-target emotions.
To determine whether individual target emotions of guilt and
pride were elicited differentially by the emotion manipulation, we
looked at data obtained during the post-experimental interviews.
Participants were asked to indicate and explain which emotion
they experienced most strongly after presentation of each IAT.
Critically, the experimenter explained the meaning of certain emo-
tions (e.g., shame and guilt) to avoid artifacts due to the erroneous
labeling of emotions. These data indicated that, following the Neg-
ative IATs, participant affective experience was predominantly that
of guilt. Apart from those individuals who were identified as having
personal characteristics and/or social-familial relationships that
prohibited them from believing the pre-programmed IAT feed-
back, participants furthermore reported that they found the IAT
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feedback convincing, and did not suspect that their IAT results
were pre-programmed.
By comparison, post-experimental interview data indicated
that, following the Positive IATs, participant affective experience
was predominantly that of satisfaction (although participants
reported significantly higher levels of pride during the emotion
elicitation paradigm). Several authors have argued that we may
feel pride when we uphold or act in accordance with our personal
moral values (Haidt, 2001; Moll et al., 2005; Zahn et al., 2009). This
response is also predicted by Duval’s objective self-awareness the-
ory, which states that congruity between self and some personal
standard should result in positive affect (Duval and Wicklund,
1972; Duval and Silvia, 2002). It is therefore unclear why the IAT
paradigm did not succeed in producing strong pride.
A feasible explanation may be that participants experienced
the Positive IAT feedback as merely cognitively pleasing/satisfying
(Levenson, 2003), rather than something that made them feel
proud about their behavior. Participants’ responses may also have
been subject to social desirability concerns: low-prejudice indi-
viduals may regard it as socially unacceptable to feel proud of
responding in a non-prejudiced fashion when that is how they
believe one should respond anyway. A third explanation for our
female participants’ low ratings of pride concerns possible gender-
specific differences in emotional experience and expression. In this
regard, evidence suggests that pride is an emotion expressed more
frequently or intensely by males (Collins and Frankenhaeuser,
1989). Pride has become associated with maleness because it is
thought to convey status to one’s social group, and males typ-
ically enjoy higher status than women in Western (and many
non-Western) societies (Tracy and Robins, 2008). A final pos-
sibility is that participants no longer felt much pride after the
emotion elicitation paradigm, given that positive events tend to be
weaker and more short-lived than equally strong negative events
(Baumeister et al., 2001; Larsen and Prizmic, 2004).
A common confounding factor in moral emotion elicitation
studies is that the purity of the emotional state is often com-
promised because the paradigm may also evoke other emotions
in parallel (Takahashi et al., 2004). The current IAT elicitation
paradigm was designed to elicit specific feelings of guilt, based
on findings from the literature on prejudice and self-discrepancy
theory: this body of research suggests that low-prejudice individ-
uals should experience specific feelings of guilt and remorse when
they transgress their own internalized moral standards (Higgins,
1987; Plant and Devine, 1998). In the current study, however, the
Negative IAT condition was marked by elevated self-ratings of
several negative emotions, in particular shame and embarrass-
ment, in addition to guilt. Shame and embarrassment were thus
also felt, despite the fact that most participants reported (during
the post-experimental interview) that guilt was their overriding
feeling following the Negative IATs.
The subjective emotion reports following the Negative IATs
may be explained by lay-people’s tendency to confuse distinc-
tions between guilt and shame in everyday situations (Tangney
and Dearing, 2002). Alternatively, elevated ratings of shame and
embarrassment may have been stimulated by the experimental
context. For example, Finger et al. (2006) reported elevated rat-
ings of guilt, shame, and embarrassment in response to stories
portraying victim-based moral transgressions. Their results, how-
ever, indicated that the presence of an audience triggered signif-
icantly higher ratings of embarrassment and shame in response
to moral transgressions, but did not impact significantly on rat-
ings of guilt. Ratings of embarrassment and shame in the present
investigation may therefore have been augmented by a “public”
factor, because participants were aware that their performances
were being observed by the experimenter.
A final way to conceive of the subjective emotion reports
obtained in the present study is to view shame and embarrass-
ment as part of the emotional profile of guilt. It may well be that
the case for “pure” guilt resulting from a social transgression is
questionable, i.e., that some element of shame (or another negative
emotion) may be present in most prototypical guilt responses. In
moral transgression, for example, a person may feel guilty for vio-
lating a social standard while at the same time feeling embarrassed
for being caught doing so, and feeling shameful about his/her own
shortcomings (Eisenberg, 2000). In a similar vein, pride has also
previously been conceptualized as the mean response to ratings of
pride and satisfaction (Williams and DeSteno, 2008).
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
Screening procedures are commonplace in emotion elicitation
research, where it is of paramount importance that participants
experience the specific emotions under investigation (e.g., Boiten,
1996; Reiman et al., 1997). Participants in the current study under-
went a relatively stringent selection process, based on demographic
and personality-based criteria applied during Stage I. Although
this procedure may be associated with some limitations (discussed
below), our results illustrated the value of employing such a set of
criteria in identifying suitable candidates for inclusion in an emo-
tion elicitation study of this nature. During the post-experimental
interviews, for example, we discovered that some participants’ per-
sonal relations, such as having Black relatives or partners, impacted
significantly on the success of the emotion manipulation. This
finding was unexpected, given that one would expect such indi-
viduals’ motivations to respond without prejudice to be primarily
internally motivated (i.e., high IMS/low EMS, unaffected by social
desirability concerns), not internally and externally motivated, as
specified by our selection criteria. A further adaptation of the
selection process should therefore be to screen out individuals
who have personal relations, such as close cross-racial friendships,
which could prevent them from believing the manipulated IAT
feedback and, thus, from experiencing guilt.
The value of implementing personality-based screening crite-
ria was also demonstrated by the correlations observed between
a number of Stage II questionnaire scores and self-reported emo-
tion ratings. These correlations highlighted associations between
certain personal characteristics and the degree of elicited affect.
In particular, we found significant correlations between disposi-
tional BIS and BAS sensitivities and subjective emotion responses:
whereas BIS scores correlated positively with moral-negative emo-
tions, BAS scores (including all BAS subscales) showed a strong
inverse relationship with basic-negative emotions. These find-
ings support the idea that individuals sensitive to aversive events
or punishment cues (i.e., those with high BIS scores), would be
likely to experience intense negative affect (in this case, guilt) in
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threatening situations (Gray, 1982). Conversely, individuals who
score high on the BAS subscales may be insensitive to BIS warnings
or cues of punishment, focusing their attention instead on cues of
incentive (Patterson et al., 1987; Patterson and Newman, 1993).
They may therefore be less likely, in general, to experience negative
affect.
In summary, pre-experiment screening measures could be tai-
lored to reflect each individual’s sociodemographic and personal-
ity characteristics, in order to optimize the elicitation of specific
target emotions. The current results suggest that there would
be value in adding the BIS/BAS scales to the set of measures
administered during the participant selection stage.
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The current study successfully elicited specific moral emotions
based on a carefully constructed prejudice paradigm. A number of
methodological limitations should be noted, however. The effec-
tiveness of our paradigm relied heavily on participants fulfilling a
set of stipulated eligibility criteria, but such a stringent selection
process may also be associated with some disadvantages. For exam-
ple, screening a large pool of participants can be time-consuming
and labor-intensive: in the current study, we screened 280 individ-
uals to obtain a sufficiently large sample of participants (N = 48).
Additionally, the use of stringent screening criteria may bias the
study sample so that it becomes unrepresentative of the general
population, which may in turn affect the generalizability of the
resulting data.
Although a pre-screening process that delivers a relatively small
pool of eligible participants might not be ideal under every
research circumstance, we argue that such an approach may be
justified in some cases. First, most existing moral emotion elicita-
tion paradigms do not succeed in eliciting real-time moral affect;
a fresh approach is therefore warranted. Second, our screening
criteria were put in place to ensure the elicitation of target emo-
tions in every participant; hence, the paradigm may be of value
for more expensive or time-consuming laboratory-based studies
of emotion. Third, the screening process we employed is relatively
simple: it involves recruitment from the general population, the
measures are straightforward to complete and widely available,
the entire screening can be delivered via a survey website, and
the choice of which candidates to include/exclude is easily per-
formed by calculating sample descriptive statistics. Finally, we feel
it is important to point out that the large number of individuals
excluded from our study reflected both the multicultural nature
of the South African population, as well as the significant amount
of interpersonal prejudice still present in our country. This situa-
tion may be less extreme in other societies; the effectiveness of our
paradigm in a more random sample is thus a question for future
research.
Another potential limitation of the study is that we did not
include males in our sample. As mentioned previously, we adopted
this recruitment strategy to avoid gender-related emotion effects.
It remains an open question, then, as to whether the elicitation par-
adigm described here would deliver effects of the same magnitude
in a male sample. Similarly, the IAT prejudice paradigm in its cur-
rent form was designed to elicit moral emotions in a homogenous
sample of college students (white, heterosexual, non-Jewish), in
order for the IAT feedback to appear plausible. Certain adaptations
would thus be necessary before the paradigm could be applied to
individuals of other races and sexual orientations.
Two further methodological limitations are that (i) we did
not counterbalance the topics of the Positive and Negative IATs
between participants, and (ii) we did not probe basic positive
emotions. Whereas the first limitation may have helped eliminate
possible confounding factors associated with specific IAT contents,
the second limitation poses a more serious concern. Because we
did not assess basic positive emotions, we cannot be certain that
our paradigm elicited moral-positive emotions selectively in the
Positive IAT condition. However, given that pride and satisfac-
tion are often used as the only measured emotions to validate the
elicitation of pride (see, e.g., Webster et al., 2003; Williams and
DeSteno, 2008), we felt that our approach was consistent with rel-
evant approaches adopted by previous research. Additionally, we
probed participants during the post-experimental interviews for
any other emotions they may have felt during the experimental
procedure.
Finally, as noted above, the pride manipulation appeared to
be less successful than the guilt manipulation. It is impossible to
determine within the current study’s context, however, whether
these lower levels of self-reported pride were a result of the emo-
tion manipulation method, social desirability concerns, or sex-
related differences in emotional responding. Future studies may
attempt to unravel these threads. Also related to this matter is
the possibility that participants’ reports of heightened guilt were
influenced by social conformity. Individuals’ awareness of social
conventions may well have led them to conclude that guilt was
the most appropriate emotion to select in response to the neg-
ative IAT feedback. Although this possibility may be difficult to
distinguish from the experience of true guilt, one way of teasing
apart these effects could be to include a prosocial measure in the
experiment. Given guilt’s well-established association with proso-
cial motivation (Tangney and Dearing, 2002), those participants
who experienced true guilt may be more inclined to engage in
reparatory behaviors (see, e.g., Amodio et al., 2007).
To conclude, in a novel departure from previously published
studies, we tested a prejudice paradigm to elicit moral emotions in
real-time. We confirmed, using a highly selected sample, that our
paradigm was effective: as predicted, the manipulated IAT feed-
back elicited moral-negative emotions (primarily guilt) under one
set of conditions, and moral-positive emotions (satisfaction and
pride) under another set of conditions. Furthermore, high BIS-
sensitive individuals experienced stronger moral-negative affect,
which supports the idea that guilt functions as a punishment
cue (Monteith, 1993); in contrast, high BAS-sensitive individ-
uals experienced reduced negative affect in general. We suggest
that this paradigm may contribute greatly to the investigation of
moral emotions as a means to induce these cardinal sensitivities
effortlessly within an experimental context.
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APPENDIX
IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TESTS
Neutral IAT condition
Sports IAT (preference for swimmers vs. runners).
Picture stimuli: images of swimmers; images of runners
Words/Attributes: Joy, Love, Peace, Happy, Wonderful, Pleasure, Glorious, Laughter, Agony, Terrible, Horrible, Nasty, Evil, Awful,
Failure, Hurt
Result: (10 s)
Your data suggest little to no automatic preference for swimmers vs. runners.
Elaborated feedback: (20 s)
Generally, people with little to no automatic preference for swimmers compared to runners:
» Adapt well to being around people engaging in either sport.
» Have no preference for watching one sport over the other on television.
» Are not intimidated by either runners or swimmers.
» Will at different times enjoy either swimming or running.
» Have had positive experiences with both types of sports.
» Are comfortable socializing with either runners or swimmers.
OR
Result: (10 s)
Your data suggest a slight automatic preference for swimmers compared to runners.
Elaborated feedback: (20 s)
Generally, people with a slight automatic preference for swimmers compared to runners:
» Prefer being around people engaged in swimming compared to running.
» Prefer watching swimming rather than running on television.
» Are slightly more intimidated by runners than swimmers.
» Most times will prefer swimming instead of running.
» Have had slightly more positive experiences with swimmers compared to runners.
» Are slightly more comfortable socializing with swimmers compared to runners.
OR
Result: (10 s)
Your data suggest a slight automatic preference for runners compared to swimmers.
Elaborated feedback: (20 s)
Generally, people with a slight automatic preference for runners compared to swimmers:
» Prefer being around people engaging in running compared to swimming.
» Prefer watching running rather than swimming on television.
» Are slightly more intimidated by swimmers than runners.
» Most times will prefer running instead of swimming.
» Have had slightly more positive experiences with runners compared to swimmers.
» Are slightly more comfortable socializing with runners compared to swimmers.
Facial hair IAT (preference for facial hair vs. no facial hair).
Picture stimuli: images of people with facial hair; images of people with no facial hair
Words/attributes: joy, love, peace, happy, wonderful, pleasure, glorious, laughter, agony, terrible, horrible, nasty, evil, awful, failure,
hurt
Result: (10 s)
Your data suggest little to no automatic preference for people with no facial hair compared to people with facial hair.
Elaborated feedback: (20 s)
Generally, people with little to no automatic preference for people with no facial hair compared to people with facial hair:
» Do not find people with facial hair more attractive than people with no facial hair.
» Treat people with facial hair with the same respect as people with no facial hair.
» Believe that everybody has the freedom to express their identity.
» Value the internal qualities of an individual rather than their external qualities.
» Do not make friendship decisions based on the presence or absence of facial hair.
» Do not stereotype people with facial hair as being unhygienic.
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OR
Result: (10 s)
Your data suggest a slight automatic preference for people with no facial hair compared to people with facial hair.
Elaborated feedback: (20 s)
Generally, people with a slight automatic preference for people with no facial hair compared to people with facial hair:
» Find people with no facial hair slightly more attractive than people with facial hair.
» Treat people with facial hair with slightly less respect than people with no facial hair.
» Believe that people should have to conform to conventional appearance ideals.
» Value the external qualities of an individual slightly more than their internal qualities.
» Sometimes make friendship decisions based on the presence or absence of facial hair.
» Sometimes stereotype people with facial hair as being unhygienic.
OR
Result: (10 s)
Your data suggest a slight automatic preference for people with facial hair compared to people with no facial hair.
Elaborated feedback: (20 s)
Generally, people with a slight automatic preference for people with facial hair compared to people with no facial hair:
» Find people with facial hair slightly more attractive than people with no facial hair.
» Treat people with no facial hair with slightly less respect than people with facial hair.
» Believe that people should not have to conform to conventional appearance ideals.
» Value the internal qualities of an individual slightly more than their external qualities.
» Sometimes make friendship decisions based on the presence or absence of facial hair.
» Do not stereotype people with facial hair as being unhygienic.
Positive IAT condition
Weight IAT (preference for thin vs. fat people).
Picture stimuli: images of fat people; images of thin people
Words/Attributes: Nice, Healthy, Pretty, Happy, Wonderful, Pleasure, Successful, Beautiful, Disgusting, Unacceptable, Terrible,
Horrible, Nasty, Awful, Failure, Unhealthy
Result: (10 s)
Your data suggest little to no automatic preference for thin vs. fat people.
Elaborated feedback: (20 s)
Generally, people with little to no automatic preference for thin compared to fat people:
» Attach value to eating healthily and exercising.
» Treat fat people with the same respect as anybody else.
» Do not believe that body weight determines success.
» Value the internal qualities of an individual rather than their external qualities.
» Do not make friendship decisions based on body weight.
» Do not stereotype fat people as being lazy.
Religion IAT (preference for Judaism vs. other religions).
Picture stimuli: Judaic images; Images of other religions (Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam)
Words/Attributes: Celebrate, Happy, Friendly, Joyful, Laughter, Beautiful, Wonderful, Cheerful, Horrible, Angry, Awful, Unpleasant,
Hate, Destroy, Brutal, Nasty
Result: (10 s)
Your data suggest little to no automatic preference for other religions compared to Judaism.
Elaborated feedback: (20 s)
Generally, people with little to no automatic preference for other religions compared to Judaism:
» Have no disregard for Jewish individuals.
» Believe that all religions are equal and should be treated with respect.
» Believe that every person should be allowed freedom to practice his/her own religion.
» Often believe strongly in human rights.
» Do not judge people based on their religious practices.
» Are themselves spiritual in some way.
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Negative IAT condition
Race IAT (preference for Black vs. White people).
Picture stimuli: faces of Black people; faces of White people
Words/Attributes: Joy, Love, Peace, Wonderful, Pleasure, Glorious, Laughter, Happy, Agony, Terrible, Horrible, Nasty, Evil, Awful,
Failure, Hurt
Result: (10 s)
Your data suggest a strong automatic preference for white vs. black people.
Elaborated feedback: (20 s)
Generally, people with a strong automatic preference for White compared to Black people:
» Are more afraid of Black people than White people.
» Often find themselves in racially skewed working environments.
» Often react uncomfortably upon meeting a Black person (e.g., by avoiding eye contact).
» Will avoid situations involving large crowds of Black people.
» Will never openly disregard black people, but always prefer white company.
» Would never have a romantic relationship with a Black person.
Sexuality IAT (preference for gay vs. straight people).
Picture stimuli: images/symbols related to gay people; images/symbols related to straight people
Words/Attributes: Joy, Love, Peace, Happy, Wonderful, Pleasure, Acceptable, Glorious, Unnatural, Horrible, Nasty, Awful, Failure,
Offensive, Wrong, Disgusting
Result: (10 s)
Your data suggest a strong automatic preference for straight compared to gay people.
Elaborated feedback: (20 s)
Generally, people with a strong automatic preference for straight compared to gay people:
» Will never openly admit to judging gay people, but donot believe in gay rights.
» Do not have any close friends who are gay.
» Have stereotyped opinions about what gay people do and who they are.
» Avoid being associated with gay people.
» Believe that homosexuality is unnatural.
» Would prefer if homosexual marriages were illegal.
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